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,le The Emergence
of "the" Problem of
Industrial Prices
Prices "at wholesale" began to be published on a continuous basis by
the Department of Labor in 1902.1 The index began with approximately
250 commodities, largely concentrated in food and clothing. The prices
were collected from trade journals, produce exchanges, and leading
manufacturers. Thus began the statistical history of American industrial
prices. This history has continued unbroken for almost 800 months and
has expanded to where it now includes more than 2,000 commodities.
Certain of the wholesale prices published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics were observed to display a remarkable stability, if not rigidity.
The price of steel rails was quoted at $28 per gross ton beginning in
1902, and continued at this level without change until the spring of
1916. Contemporary students attributed the price stability to the United
States Steel Corporation, without explaining satisfactorily why this
company should wish an unchanging price.2 Surely such an explanation
1 See Bulletin of the Department of Labor, No. 39 (Washington, D.C., March
1902). The data were collected back to 1890. The famous Aldrich Report of the
U.S. Senate Finance Committee had compiled price information from 1840
through 1891.
2 Abraham Bergiund, The United States Steel Corporation, New York, 1907,
pp. 143, 168, 171—72; Eliot Jones, The Trust Problem in the United States, New
York, 1924, p. 230. Bergiund suggested that the failure of the price to rise in
booms discouraged entry of new rivals, which in turn made it easier to avoid
cutthroat competition in depressions. The effect of the practice, one would think,
would be only to encourage entry in depression rather than in prosperity.12 The Behavior of Industrial Prices
seemed called for: both the generally accepted theory of monopoly Suc
price and the theory of competitive price state that market prices will pri(
change when demand and cost conditions change—and, of course, bu
over long periods itis inconceivable that demand and cost remain
rigid or dance together. fec
The flow of casual comments on price rigidity continued, but not mo
until 1927 was the first comprehensive examination of the flexibility pet
of industrial prices made, in Frederick Mills' The Behavior of Prices.3 had
He plotted the frequency distribution of changes in all monthly whole- dec
sale prices by seven-year periods from 1890 and found a concentration
of prices at the two extremes of frequent and infrequent change, a
U-shaped distribution, that persisted throughout the entire The drt
"curious concentrations" at the two ends of the distribution were not 19:
explicitly associated with the operation of the price system, however, of
and this aspect of Mills' study received scant attention from con- infi
temporary readers, art
The behavior of industrial prices entered a new era of study and fro
opinion in 1935 when Gardiner Means' celebrated monograph, Indus- on
trial Prices and Their Relative Inflexibility, was published.5 Means tin'
tabulated the frequency of change of some 677. monthly prices and in
found that a large number changed very infrequently. Indeed, in the bul
eight-year period, 1926 through 1933, fourteen prices did not change pri
a single time and seventy-seven prices changed only one to four times. tha
He coined the phrase "administered prices" to describe the rigid prices CUt
andoffered a definition: an
W
administered price]is a price set by administrative action and held
constant for a period of time. We have an administered price when a corn- no pany maintains a posted price at which it will make sales or simply has its
own prices at which buyers may purchase or not as they wish. Thus, when
111
theGeneral Motors management sets its wholesale price for six months or by
a year, the price is an administered price.6 cre
New York, NBER, 1927. Co.
Ibid., pp. 56 if. Mills also measured the magnitude of the within-year fluctua- hal
tion of prices by the mean absolute deviation from the yearly average, pp. 39 if,
489 if. A corresponding measure of year-to-year variability calculated from link
relatives was also presented, pp. 49 if, 497 if. on
Senate Document 13 (January 17, 1935), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1944
6lbid., p.1.Such prices were distinguished by Means from a market-determined
price, "which is made in the market as the result of the interaction of
buyers and sellers".
The administered prices, Means believed, were destroying "the ef-
fective functioning of the American economy". In particular, the com-
modities whose prices were rigid in the Great Depression often ex-
perienced great falls in output, whereas those commodities whose prices
had fallen greatly (farm products, in particular) experienced only small
decreases in output.
These startlingstatistics of price rigidity—for which neoclassical
price theory had no explanation—and the sweeping inferences that were
drawn about the role of price rigidity in the economic malaise of the
19 30's promptly commanded wide attention. In fact, Means was guilty
of understatement when, two years later, he said that discussion of
inflexible prices had been "somewhat stimulated by[his]previous
articles". He had in fact created a new subject. In the forty-nine years
from 1886 to 1935 the index of Economic Journals lists three articles
on rigid prices; in the next four years itlists fourteen. If we con-
tinue to use the index of Economic Journals as our measure, interest
in inflexible prices flagged from 1940 to 1954 (only seven articles)
but then revived (twenty-five articles in 1954—65) after administered
prices were charged with some of the responsibility for inflation. Al-
though the index crudely measures current writing, it does not measure
cumulative effects, and the doctrine of administered prices had achieved
an important place in professional thinking on industrial prices after
World War II.
The proposition 'that in many important industrial markets prices do
not respond quickly or fully to changing supply and demand conditions
in the way a competitive market would had become generally accepted
by the late 1930's. It was accepted first by the economists and then in-
creasingly by the general public. Public acceptance is illustrated by the
Congressional hearings to which changes in the price of steel products
have been subjected since
For example, "Increases in Steel Prices", Hearings before the Joint Committee
on the Economic Report, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (March 2, 1948); 'December
1949 Steel Price Increases", Report of the Joint Committee on the Economic
Report, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., Report No. 1373 (March 27, 1950); and "1958


























link14 The Behavior of Industrial Prices
This attitude toward the industrial markets—at least those marked
by a fair degree of concentration of output in a few large firms—was theory
strengthened in the 1950's. A number of influential economists at-
tributed inflationary price changes in periods of less than fUll employ- mflexilj.
inent precisely to the behavior of "administered prices." Again Gardiner ence
Means was a leader of professional, and public, opinion. In widely to be
publicized testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and to
Monopoly (the Kefauver Committee) in 1957, Means said,
As far as I can discover this recent price increase has not been the result ii
ofexcessive buying power or demand but, at least to a very considerable j
extent, has been a result of action within the area of discretion in which Even
prices and wage rates are made. This is suggested by the rise of administered Versy
prices while market prices were stable or falling. This is a new phenomenon.
I do not find it anywhere in our history of prices.8 Many
This view was endorsed in substantial measure by economists as eminent there
as Abba Lerner and J. K. Gaibraith, and it led to influential statistical impro1
studies such as the monograph by Otto Eckstein and Gary Fromm nificail
which attributed a large share of the rise of wholesale prices in the Index-i
1950's to the price policy of the steel industry.9 From this background sale p4
there was a natural evolution to the "guidelines" of price and wage At 1
policyannounced by the Council of Economic Advisers in 1962 and prove4
applied to steel, copper, aluminum and other products in a series of basic
highly dramatic confrontations of the Presidential office and the in- collec
dustries in question. view
We have not and shall not examine in detail these views of the
various roles of "administered" prices in depression and inflation. The
basic purpose in this sketchy outline is simply to emphasize that gen- flOW
erally accepted views on the nature of the functioning of the industrial W
price system have emerged inthe last generation. They have not price
there
Steel Price Increase", Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and (Janti
Monopoly, Part VIII (1959). tweiv4 "Administered Prices," Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, Part I, p. 88; see also Part ix.
"Steel and the Postwar Inflation", Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong., exped
1st Sess., Nov. 6, 1959. The analysis was reviewed and seriously challenged by haps
Martin Bailey, "Steel and the Postwar Rise in the Wholesale Price Index", Journal
of Business, April 1962.
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A emergedin response to the development of a coherent, widely accepted
arke'.'
was theory that industrial prices will display downward rigidityin any
Lsat- meaningful sense; on the contrary, no theoretical explanation for price
lo - inflexibilityhas commanded wide and continued acceptance. The exist-
ence of inflexible industrial prices is accepted because itis believed
jdel to be an implacable empirical fact. One large purpose of our study is
y
todetermine whether it is indeed a fact.
.t and
result THE QUALITY OF THE PRICE INFORMATION
erable Even if the wholesale price data had not become involved in contro-
stered versy over the workings of the price system, one would expect the
Lenon. quality of the data to be subjected to periodic review and improvement.
Many of the prices are used in the escalation of contract prices, so
there are impressive financial stakes upon the movements of prices. The
istical improvements in the quality of retail price data—influenced to a sig-
romm nificant degree by controversies over the validity of the Consumer Price
n the Index—would be expected to lead to contagious improvements in whole-
round sale prices.
wage At the level of literal detail the wholesale prices have no doubt im-
1 and proved substantially since 1902, but the improvements have had two
ies of basic limitations. First, all improvements came from within the price
te in- collecting agency—there has never been a comprehensive outside re-
view of the data. Second, the improvements have concentrated largely
f the upon increasing precision in the specification of the commodities to be
The priced, to the neglect of other and possibly more basic questions. We
gen- now document this neglect.
istrial When the continuous reporting of prices began in 1902, monthly
e not prices were reported retroactively for twelve complete years.It was
therefore possible for a price change to occur eleven times in January
st and (January 1890 began the series and December 1901 terminated it) and
Anti- twelve times in each other month. For most of the nonfood corn-
Lrt ix. modities initially included in the Wholesale Price Index, one would
Cong., expect price changes to occur equally often in each month—or, per-
our, hapsbetter put, price changes should come when market conditions
change, and these changes come throughout the year even for sea-
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sonal goods. Yet when the frequency of price changes of 19 commodi-
ties reported by companies in "metals and implements" is analyzed, it
is found that 32 of 190 price changes (or 16.8 per cent) came in
January, although only 7.6 per cent of price changes were expected in
that month.'° an
Such a concentration in January could not arise by chance (the odds
against it are a million to one). (For the 20 metals whose prices were
reported by trade publications or governmental bureaus, January price fr(
changes were only 7.7 per cent of 2,081 price changes.) An even more tvV
striking result holds for cloth and clothing, where 272 of 1,839 price
changes, or 14.8 per cent, occurred in January. The conclusion is sta- cai
tisticallyirresistiblethat many manufacturers reported prices on a va
calendar-year basis so the within-year price rigidity was due only to rel.
the method of reporting prices. Although this kind of test could have bla
been made in 1902, it was not made then or afterward. Tfl
It should perhaps occasion little surprise that the quality of the whole- sex
sale prices was not examined with any care in the long period preceding La
Means' celebrated monograph.'1 It is more surprising that the importance
of Means' findings attracted little attention to the question of validity
'IJ after 1935. Means himself wrote as follows:
S
aft
Do the Bureau of Labor Statistics figures accurately reflect actual prices? ma
It has been held that the Bureau's price series have to do with list price, not
an1
with actual price. However, the Bureau of Labor Statistics asks for and tYl
usually gets net prices. Where there are list prices this means the list prices as
less all regular discounts. Presumably the resulting price quotations do not Th
reflect unusual special discounts. In some cases, errors undoubtedly creep in.
In examining a number of the Bureau's price series invOlving inflexible
prices, I have become convinced the bulk of their quotations represented
B net prices. The exceptions seemed unlikely to falsify seriously the picture
U
which I presented. Consultation with the technical staff of the Bureau of Ad
Labor Statistics supports this view. So far as this question is concerned, I 621
am confident that the statistical picture is not seriously faulty.'2 ba
10Thatis, 11 out of 143 possible changes for each series (adjusted for the in-: ii
completeness of 4 of the 19 series).
11EvenWesley Clair Mitchell's justly famous monograph, The Making and Gai
Using of index Numbers, Bulletin No. 173, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wash- Wa
ington, 1915, gives only passing attention to the quality of the price data.
12"Noteson Inflexible Prices", American Economic Review, March 1936,
p. 28. AptI
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Ii But this passage does not present the evidence which would lead the
reader to share Means' confidence in the data.
In 1939 Saul Nelson made the first substantial study of the accuracy
• of the wholesale price data.13 The variety of discounts, terms of trade,
and secret concessions used by secretive price cutters was described by
ds Nelson, and the failure of the BLS to capture all price movements was
re illustrated by fertilizer and salt. Receipts per unit of output, calculated
ce from Census of Manufactures data, were also compared with prices for
re twenty-eight commodities. The sample was not felicitous:it contained
ce three agricultural implements, and uninteresting commodities such as
•a- canned peaches and dried peaches. The agreement between Census unit
a values and BLS prices was good in perhaps half the cases and in the
to remainder varied from fair to very bad (men's shirts, sulfuric acid, bone
ye black, asphalt). Nelson drew the conclusion:
These observations make the use of caution in dealing with individual price
le- series imperative. However, they do not preclude the use of Bureau of
ng Labor Statistics wholesale price data as statistical bases for broad economic
ce investigations. In analyses of price rigidity and amplitude of price movement,
it becomes necessary to place emphasis upon broad and consistent relation-
ity ships and to avoid relying upon small differences in absolute figures. Yet,
after all due allowance is made for the factors demanding caution, very
marked and significant differences still remain between the behavior of rigid
es. and flexible prices. For the statement and interpretation of such different
jot types of price behavior, Bureau of Labor Statistics series can be regarded
nd as furnishing an acceptable basis.14
aot This conclusion appears to go well beyond the assurance provided by
in. Nelson's tests.
ble The second large test of quoted prices was made in 1943 by the
te Bureau of Labor Statistics under a contract with the Office of Price are
of Administration.15 The BLS collected more than 2,200 price series from
I,i 629 firms which bought steel products directly from steel mills in car-
load lots. Prices paid were compared with quoted prices (after adjust-
in- "A Consideration of the Validity of the Bureau of Labor Statistics Price In-
dexes", Appendixiinthe National Resources Committee report(of which
and GardinerMeans was the director), TheStructureof theAmericanEconomy,
Washington, 1939.
p. 185.
)36, 15 "Labor Dept. Examines Consumers' Prices of Steel Products", Iron Age,
April 25, 1946, Pp. 118 if.18 The Behavior of Industrial Prices
TABLE 2-1












































SouRce: "Labor Department Examines Consumers' Prices of Steel Products",
ironAge, April25,1946,p. 134.
ingfor charges for "extras" and transportation) in six quarters falling
in the period 1939 to 1942. In 1939 and 1940, before industry opera-
tions reached high rates relative to capacity and before price ceilings
were imposed, price cutting was extensive (a sample summary is given
in Table 2-1 )Thisstudy certainly served to reduce confidence in the
reliability of quoted prices in the period before World War II. The elab-
orate test (which cost several hundred thousand dollars) was never
repeated.
The Price Statistics Review Committee, of which one of the present
writers was chairman, devoted more attention to the problem of whole-
sale prices. One staff paper in particular, that of Professor Harry Mc-
Allister, subjected the price reports of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to
intensive analysis, to reach disquieting results. The Bureau's prices are
based upon one, two, three, or more reporters (companies, in our con-
text) and McAllister tabulated the frequency of price change by the
number of reporters, on the basis of a sample of one-third of the BLS
prices. His analysis (see Table 2-2) demonstrated that the number of
18The average ratio of invoice to quoted price for hot rolled sheets was 92
percent in thesecond quarter of 1939 and 85 percent inthe third quarter, 94






























Type of Reporter 1 2 3 4More
Company Data
Crude Materials .474.470.526.500.480
Intermediate Materials .096.143 .212.207.392
Finished Materials .106.112.196.215.276
Nonfood Materials
Company Data .103.143.206.207 .392
Publications Data .239 .444
Consumer-Goods Other thanFood
Company Data .056.101 .170.200.287
Publications Data .258 .444
SOURCE: "Government Price Statistics", Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961,
pp. 388, 390.
reporters was a major determinant of the numberof reported price
changes.In fact, for certain classes of commodities the data permit one
toassert that the probability that any one company will change its prices
for a givencommodityin a givenmonthis independent of such change
by other companies in the same industry in that month. To an economist
such an implication seems absolutely unacceptable and casts grave
doubts on the underlying data.
A possible explanation for this peculiar price behavior is that the
industries with only one price reporter differ substantially from those
with two or more reporters—in fact, the former industries are more
concentrated. This explanation, however, was shown by McAllister to
be insufficient.'7 No other plausible explanation is at hand.
He took random samples of the prices reported by one, two, three, etc.,
sellers of commodities for which there were numerous reporters to obtain again
the patterns of price change by number of reporters already observed. See
"Government Price Statistics", Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic
Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 391.
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TABLE 2-2
Frequency of Price Changes per Month, December 1953 to December 1956
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Means once described his work as applying "a new kind of analysis
to the best available supply of wholesale price data"—the new ap-
proach consisting of "taking a series of price data for an individual
commodity and counting the number of price changes in a given time
period".'5 So far as his original work is concerned, this description was
largely true. The McAllister analysis effectively destroys the entire body
of work resting upon frequency of price change. But even if Means'
original work rested heavily upon frequency of price change, and made
so dramatic an impact because of the startling findings on frequency,
the importance of administered prices never rested upon this negligible
basis. Its essential thrust was with respect to amplitude of price changes:
few economists would have taken so seriously the infrequency of price
changes if the prices had changed by large amounts.'9 Our own work,
to which we now turn, confirms the view that frequency of changes in
monthly prices is of little economic importance.
It
"Notes on Inflexible Prices", American Economic Review Supplement, March po
1936, P. 23.
19 Indeed T. Scitovsky had shown that the U-shaped distribution of prices by
frequency of price change arose because all prices which changed once or more ti
per month were grouped together, and if price changes per day or hour were rel
allowed, there would be no modal group of commodities with frequently changing
prices. See "Prices under Monopoly and Competition", Journal of Political Econ-
omy, October 1941. p
cd
eu
rei